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Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in
"Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions
David E. Seidelson*
I trust that the current controversy over the premium rates
charged physicians for professional liability insurance will become
the subject of a political resolution which will permit the practice
of medicine to continue to be an economically feasible activity. I
hope that that resolution will not emasculate either the existing or
the emerging body of decisional law governing medical malpractice
actions. On the basis of that trust and that hope, I would like to
undertake an examination of some of the problems which exist in
that decisional law as it applies to informed consent.
There is a marked divergence of opinion among the various jurisdictions as to the extent of disclosure which a physician must make
to a patient as a condition precedent to securing the patient's informed consent to a contemplated therapeutic procedure. Two basically different views emerge from the existing opinions: (1) the extent of disclosure required will be determined by the application of
a professional standard,' or (2) all material risks incident to the
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. The following jurisdictions apparently judge the adequacy of the disclosure by the
professional standard.
Alabama: Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
Alaska: Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alas. 1964).
Arizona: Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975).
Colorado: Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970).
Delaware: DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Coleman v. Garrison,
327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974) (applying DiFilippo).
Florida: Miriam Mascheck, Inc. v. Mausner, 264 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972),
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proposed treatment must be revealed.' The first view, currently the
applying Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Ditlow v. Kaplan, supra.
Hawaii: Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).
Illinois: Green v. Hussey, 127 Il1. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970).
Iowa: Grsjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966).
Kansas: Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606, 512 P.2d 529 (1973).
Maryland: Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534 (1972) (without specific decision, trial court's use of professional standard referred to).
Massachusetts: Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962) (dissenting
opinion to the contrary).
Michigan: Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Marchlewicz v.
Stanton, 50 Mich. App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973).
Mississippi: Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970).
Missouri: Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
Montana: Collins v. Itoh, 160 Mont. 461, 503 P.2d 36 (1972).
New Jersey: Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971), modified, 62 N.J.
267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967), a/f'd
per curiam, 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968).
Texas: Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), af'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974), applying Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967);
Wilson v. Scott, supra.
Wyoming: Stundon v. Stadnick, 469 P.2d 16 (Wyo. 1970).
2. The following jurisdictions apparently require disclosure of all material risks.
California: Slater v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. App. 3d 819, 113 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Ct. App. 1974),
applying Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 509 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
supra.
District of Columbia: Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).
Louisiana: Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 294 So. 2d 618 (La. App.), writ denied,
299 So. 2d 788 (La. 1974):
Because there is very little Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject of informed consent, plaintiff cites many decisions from other jurisdictions which state that the physician has a duty to warn of dangers lurking in proposed treatment and to impart
information which the patient has a right to expect. We agree that a physician does
have a duty to disclose material facts reasonably necessary to allow the patient to form
the basis of an intelligent consent.
294 So. 2d at 620.
New Mexico: Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962) (full disclosure implied, and so read in Cobbs v. Grant, supra).
New York: Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1975), applying Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973);
Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., supra; Barnette v. Potenza, 79 Misc. 2d 51, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup.
Ct. 1974), applying Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., supra.
Oregon: Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).
Pennsylvania: The Health Care Services Malpractice Act of Oct. 15, 1975, No. 111, § 103,
[19751 Laws of Pa. 297 provides:
"Informed consent" means for the purposes of this act and of any proceedings arising
under the provisions of this act, the consent of a patient to the performance of health
care services by a physician or podiatrist: Provided, That prior to the consent having
been given, the physician or podiatrist has informed the patient of the nature of the
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prevailing one,' is predicated upon a judicial conclusion that the
degree of revelation in each case is a matter to be determined by
proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to treatment or
diagnosis that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision whether
or not to undergo treatment or diagnosis. No physician or podiatrist shall be liable for
a failure to obtain an informed consent in the event of an emergency which prevents
consulting the patient. No physician or podiatrist shall be liable for failure to obtain
an informed consent if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that furnishing the information in question to the patient would have resulted in a seriously
adverse effect on the patient or on the therapeutic process to the material detriment
of the patient's health.
See also Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970), construing Gray v. Grunnagle, 423
Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971),
construing Gray v. Grunnagle, supra.
Rhode Island: Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
Washington: Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd per curiam,
85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975): "We can add nothing constructive to the well considered opinion of that court and, accordingly, approve and adopt the reasoning thereof." 85
Wash. 2d at 151, 530 P.2d at 334. This resulted in rejection of the professional standard earlier
applied in ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). See
Young v. Group Health Cooperative, 85 Wash. 2d 332, 534 P.2d 1349 (1975): "This case was
brought to trial prior to our decision in Miller v. Kennedy . . . which abandoned the ZeBarth
case in this regard." Id. at 336 n.1, 534 P.2d at 1352 n.1.
Wisconsin: Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975);
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973).
The following jurisdictions appear to have idiosyncratic or unclear (to this author) conclusions.
Idaho: Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 1973). In this diversity case,
after concluding that "[tihere is no case law in Idaho establishing the principle of informed
consent or the standard to be applied if, in fact, such a principle should exist," id. at 1076,
the court predicted that Idaho would require "as a rule of disclosure the medical community
standard for general procedures, but when relatively complicated surgery is involved, a doctor
must, in addition, disclose known risks of death or serious bodily injury." Id. at 1077.
Maine: Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974). After concluding that plaintiffs
evidence failed to satisfy either standard, the court stated, "The decision as to whether the
duty to disclose is governed by medical or by legal standards will be made when the facts of
a particular case so require." Id. at 92.
Minnesota: Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958) (implies full disclosure but conclusion not clear, in part because of battery characterization).
North Carolina: Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975) (implied
approval of professional standard).
Oklahoma: Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973) (plaintiff may proceed under
either standard but evidence in case insufficient as to both).
Tennessee: Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975) (unclear); Campbell
v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1970) (unclear); Ray v. Scheibert, 484 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1972) (unclear); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563
(1964).
Virginia: Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960) (apparently professional standard as to physician's suspicion of foreign body in wound after treatment).
3. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
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medical judgment, taking into account not only the risks incident
to the proposed procedure but, as well, the adverse effects on the
patient's physical or emotional well-being which might result from
a full disclosure.' The second view, presently the minority conclusion but apparently attracting new adherents,' is based on judicial
recognition of the patient's right of self-determination in regard to
what is to be done with or to his body. Because my own inclination
is toward the "self-determination" or "full-disclosure" rule, and
because there already exists a substantial literature, consisting of
judicial opinions7 and scholarly articles,' precisely identifying and
carefully weighing the legitimate and persuasive reasons underlying
each of the two approaches, it is the purpose of this article not to
4.

See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965):
The question is not what, regarding the risks involved, the juror would relate to the
patient under the same or similar circumstances, or even what a reasonable man would
relate, but what a reasonable medical practitionerwould do. Such practitioner would
consider the state of the patient's health, the condition of his heart and nervous
system, his mental state, and would take into account, among other things, whether
the risks involved were mere remote possibilities or something which occurred with
some sort of frequency or regularity. This determination involves medical judgment
as to whether disclosure of possible risks may have such an adverse effect on the
patient as to jeopardize success of the proposed therapy, no matter how expertly
performed.
5. "We note the trend is to approach the problem from the standpoint of the patient and
his interests-requiring the physician to disclose all risks and material facts to the patient
...
."Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 238, 523 P.2d 211, 217 (1974). Examination of
the cases cited in notes 1 and 2 supra indicates that where a recent change of judicial view
has occurred, as in Washington, the change is from the professional standard to full disclosure.
6. "In our view, the patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to
reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information
to enable an intelligent choice." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves." 464 F.2d at 784.
7. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Ditlow v. Kaplan,
181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1966); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.
1967); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORD. L. REV. 639 (1968);
Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1969) (perhaps
the single most influential article on the subject); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice, 55 CAUF. L. REV. 1396 (1967) (with varying standards applied to a hypothetical
case); Comment, Valid Consent to Medical Treatment: Need the Patient Know?, 4 DuQ. L.
REV. 450 (1966).
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attempt to demonstrate which view is preferable but rather, to attempt to identify and resolve some of the difficulties which the fulldisclosure view has generated.
It should be noted that, although some of the courts which have
adopted the full-disclosure rule may have been influenced toward
that conclusion by the "conspiracy of silence," ' their adoption of
that rule is not likely to obviate the plaintiff's need for expert medical testimony. There is some irony in that conclusion. To some
extent, and, arguably, to a rather substantial extent, the theory of
liability predicated on the absence of patient's informed consent
was a product of the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel to avoid nonsuits
or directed verdicts in medical practice actions due to the absence
of expert medical testimony establishing the appropriate professional standard by which defendant physicians' conduct was to be
judged. For example, if a patient died as a consequence of a surgeon's decision to anesthetize the patient while the patient was
weakened by the recent ingestion of a substantial quantity of alchol,
a wrongful death action against the surgeon would surely fail unless
plaintiff introduced expert medical testimony that surgeon's decision to operate in those circumstances violated the professional
standard. 0 However, if the wrongful death action could be couched
in terms of the absence 6f an informed consent, and if the jurisdic-

tion applied the full-disclosure rule, evidence that the surgeon had
failed to apprise patient of the material risk of administering the
anesthesia in such circumstances would constitute a legally sufficient action even absent expert medical testimony. At least that was
9. "[Als a practical matter, we must consider the plaintiff's difficulty in finding a physician who would breach the 'community of silence' by testifying against the interest of one of
his professional colleagues." Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650
(1971).
In speaking of the reluctance of one professional to testify against another, we are
aware that in Coleman v. McCarthy, 53 R.I. 266, 165 A. 900 (1923), this court thought
this difficulty was more apparent than real because of the Superior Court's statutory
power to appoint expert witnesses who may subsequently testify at trial . . . .This
observation was made in a day when malpractice suits were a rarity. Today, we think
it is obvious that while the court can appoint an expert, there is no compulsion on the
part of the appointee to serve, particularly if he thinks his court appearance may
jeopardize the renewal of his malpractice insurance or result in an increase in the
premium paid by his colleagues.
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 623-24, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972). See Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 158 (1966).
10. Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 P. 488 (1920).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 14: 309

the anticipation of counsel representing plaintiffs in such cases. But
it didn't work out quite that way.
Since the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint in an informed consent case in a jurisdiction requiring full disclosure is that defendant
failed to advise the patient of all material risks incident to the
treatment, plaintiff's case-in-chief must present appropriate evidence of those material risks. And, generally, only a duly qualified
expert medical witness can identify those material risks." While it
may be true that some risks are so patently incident to a given
medical procedure that they would constitute an appropriate subject for judicial notice," that same conclusion would foreclose the
possibility that nondisclosure of those risks was culpable. Even the
full-disclosure rule requires disclosure only of those risks unknown
to the patient. If a particular risk is so generally well known in the
community that it may be judicially noticed, it is not likely to have
been unknown to the patient. At a somewhat diminished level of
certainty of knowledge, it is conceivable that a judge could conclude
that, as to a particular risk, a jury of laymen, even absent expert
medical testimony, could determine that it was incident to a particular procedure. Again, however, it seems likely that, if laymen are
competent to recognize a risk as incident to a medical procedure,
so too should plaintiff patient have recognized the risk even absent
disclosure by defendant physician. Consequently, the full-disclosure
rule is not calculated to eliminate the need for expert medical testimony in plaintiffs case-in-chief; rather, it changes the thrust of
such testimony from the establishment of a professional standard
which differs from defendant's conduct to the identification of material risks incident to the particular procedure. That change in
content may diminish somewhat the reluctance of a physician to
testify for plaintiff in a medical malpractice action, but it does not
eliminate the need for expert medical testimony.
11. "There are obviously important roles for medical testimony in such cases, and some
roles which only medical evidence can fill. Experts are ordinarily indispensable to identify
and elucidate for the fact-finder the risks of therapy and the consequences of leaving
existing maladies untreated." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791-92 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
12. In the new Federal Rules of Evidence, judicial notice of an adjudicative fact is permitted when the "judicially noticed fact" is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
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Assuming that the plaintiff is able to secure an expert medical
witness willing to so testify, may that witness identify certain medically cognizable risks as "material risks"? The objection likely to be
asserted by defendant to the use of that phrase in the testimony of
plaintiff's expert is that it goes to an ultimate issue in the case, i.e.,
which, if any, of the cognizable risks were material. The "ultimate
issue" objection to expert testimony did enjoy a period of favor in
American jurisprudence. 3 Those courts which sustained such an
objection generally explained that decision in terms of an apprehension that receiving expert testimony stated in terms of the ultimate
issue would usurp the jury's fact-finding function. 4 Implicit in that
rationale was a judicial belief that jurors would unquestionably
embrace the testimony offered by a duly qualified expert witness.
Today that judicial concern seems almost unbelievably naive. Jurors tend to be zealous protectors of their fact-finding function and,
typically, possess a healthy skepticism of expert testimony, which
is regularly nurtured by counsel's cross-examination of hostile experts. Moreover, in virtually every case in which expert testimony
is appropriate, the conclusions and opinions offered by plaintiff's
experts and defendant's experts are likely to be dramatically inconsistent. In an informed consent case in a full-disclosure jurisdiction,
for example, the conclusions of plaintiff's expert as to which risks
were material may well be controverted by the testimony of defendant's expert. In the face of such controverted and inconsistent
expert opinions, the jury, even discounting its fervor in retaining its
legitimate functions, could hardly embrace unquestioningly the testimony of either expert.
Judicial recognition of the reluctance of jurors to surrender their
13. But until about twenty-five years ago, a very substantial number of courts had
gone far beyond this commonsense reluctance to listen to the witness's views as to how
the judge and jury should exercise their functions and had announced the general
doctrine that witnesses would not be permitted to give their opinions or conclusions
upon an ultimate fact in issue.
McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 27 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].

14. The reason was sometimes given that such testimony "usurps the function" or
"invades the province" of the jury. Obviously these expressions were not intended to
be taken literally, but merely to suggest the danger that the jury might forego independent analysis of the facts and bow too readily to the opinion of an expert or otherwise
influential witness.
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fact-finding obligation to any witness and of the likelihood of conflicting expert testimony in most cases probably explains the current general rejection of the ultimate issue objection.'" There does
continue to exist, however, one area in which the objection retains
viability. When the ultimate issue consists of words or phrases of
legal art, courts continue to be reluctant to permit expert testimony
in those specific terms." That reluctance is probably well founded.
Even "the world's foremost authority" in some science or art (other
than law) is unlikely to be competent to testify in words or phrases
of legal art. Where an offered will is challenged on the ground of
absence of "testamentary capacity," for example, neither testator's
lifelong treating physician nor a world renowned medical specialist
in that infirmity which allegedly deprived testator of the necessary
legal capacity should be deemed competent to testify to the presence or absence of "testamentary capacity."' 7 There would seem to
be no reason for indulging in the assumption ,that either of those
medical experts is sufficiently qualified as a legal expert to conclude
that testator had or lacked testamentary capacity. Obviously, that
doesn't mean that their relevant, conceivably critical, medical testimony should be excluded or even diminished in significance. It
means only that neither should be permitted to offer his opinion of
testator's condition in the precise terminology of the law when that
15. Although the rule had been followed in many states prior to 1942, there has
been a trend since then to abandon or reject it with the result that now in a majority
of state courts an expert may state his opinion upon an ultimate fact, provided that
all other requirements for admission of expert opinion are met.
Id. Accord, FED. R. EVID. 704: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact."
16. FED. R. EVID. 704, 28 U.S.C.A. App. (1975) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed
Rules) provides:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all
opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and
Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford
ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury
what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day.
They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored
legal criteria. Thus the question, "Did T have capacity to make a will?" would be
excluded, while the question, "Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the
nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?" would be allowed.
Id. (citation omitted). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 13, at 28 & n.55.
17. See note 16 supra.
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nomenclature is a phrase of legal art. Rather, counsel, whether proponent or opponent, should elicit answers in lay (from a legal point
of view) language which is synonymous with the legal art phraseology.1 Such synonymous lay language exists for every phrase of legal
art; if it did not, the legal esoterica would be devoid of intelligible
meaning and wholly without efficacy in every case in which a jury
trial is possible, for a significant portion of a trial judge's obligation
in instructing a jury is to explain in language comprehensible to the
jury each of the legal art phrases which the jury will be required to
utilize.
It becomes necessary, then, to determine whether or not "material risks," when used to describe certain medically cognizable risks
incident to a particular therapeutic procedure, constitutes a phrase
of legal art. One is virtually compelled to an affirmative answer, for
several reasons. First, it seems fair to assume that various physicians would have various and probably inconsistent views about
which cognizable risks were material, if each were free to make his
own determination of "material risk." Second, those jurisdictions
which have embraced the full-disclosure rule have imparted to the
phrase "material risk" relatively precise definitions which may differ considerably from a layman's conclusion as to the legal meaning
of the phrase. For example, a layman might well conclude that a
risk was material, for purposes of the full-disclosure rule, if knowledge of that risk would have dissuaded the patient from consenting
to the proposed medical procedure. Another layman might conclude
that a risk was material if knowledge of that risk would have dissuaded him from consenting to the procedure. And a medical expert-lay in a legal sense-might conclude that only those risks
which would have dissuaded him from consenting to the procedure
were material. Each of these lay conclusions might be significantly
different from the others and each, apparently, differs from the legal
meaning intended for "material risks" in full-disclosure jurisdictions. Therefore, the phrase should be considered one of legal art
and, for that reason, inappropriate for testimonial use by either
side's experts in an informed consent case in a full-disclosure jurisdiction. As a consequence, and as a means of retaining the greatest
utility for appropriate expert testimony in informed consent cases,
18.

Id.
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counsel on both sides should put to the experts questions calculated
to elicit ultimate responses in that lay language which is synonymous with "material risks."
That, in turn, raises the question of what constitutes a "material
risk" in an informed consent case being tried in a full-disclosure
jurisdiction. One of the earliest and perhaps one of the most influential of the full-disclosure cases is Canterbury v. Spence." In
Canterbury,the court adopted the following language as determinative of the materiality of a risk:
[A] risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster
of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed ther2
apy. 0
19.
20.

464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Id. at 787, quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 628, 640 (1970). Here and at other points in this article, I have excerpted language from
Canterbury for the purpose of examining the court's rationale and indicating my own agreement or disagreement with that rationale and the conclusion supported by it. The Canterbury
opinion was selected from among those cases rejecting the professional standard and requiring
full disclosure, not because I consider Canterbury a vulnerable "whipping boy" but rather
because (1) it has been uniquely influential and (2) it is, in my opinion, one of the most
thoughtfully considered and precisely written of the judicial opinions adopting the fulldisclosure rule.
At one point in its opinion, the Canterbury court states:
Experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's decision
on treatment, or to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision.
These conspicuous examples of permissible uses of nonexpert testimony illustrate the
relative freedom of broad areas of the legal problem of risk nondisclosure from the
demands for expert testimony that shackle plaintiffs' other types of medical malpractice litigation.
464 F.2d at 792.
At another point, the court notes:
Of necessity, the content of the disclosure rests in the first instance with the physician. Ordinarily it is only he who is in position to identify particular dangers; always
he must make a judgment, in terms of materiality, as to whether and to what extent
revelation to the patient is called for. He cannot know with complete exactitude what
the patient would consider important to his decision, but on the basis of his medical
training and experience he can sense how the average, reasonable patient expectably
would react. Indeed, with knowledge of, or ability to learn, his patient's background
and current condition, he is in a position superior to that of most others-attorneys,
for example-who are called upon to make judgments on pain of liability in damages
for unreasonable miscalculation.
Id. at 787.
Those two excerpts are logically reconcilable. The second recognizes the initial obligation of
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Rather clearly, that language contemplates an objective, rather
than a subjective, standard for determining materiality. A risk is
material only if it would be likely to affect the decision of a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances. Thus, to avoid an appropriate ultimate issue objection to a medical opinion couched in
terms of legal art and, simultaneously, to preserve the greatest efficacy for his expert's testimony, proponent should have the expert
witness identify those risks incident to the therapeutic procedure
which, in the witness' opinion, would affect the decision of a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances to undergo or forego the
proposed procedure.
While that may take care of the ultimate issue objection, it seems
to create an even more basic problem. Those courts which have
embraced the full-disclosure rule have done so because of their recognition that, in the words of the Canterbury opinion, "[riespect
for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves." 2 If full disclosure is mandated by the patient's right of self-determination but
materiality is to be determined by the reasonable person standard,
an inherent inconsistency arises. It is quite possible that the patient's decision to undergo the proposed medical procedure would
have been affected, even converted into a decision to decline the
procedure, by disclosure of a particular incident risk which would
not have affected the decision of a reasonable person (as determined
by expert witness or jury) in like circumstances. To the extent that,
given a particular revelation, patient would have declined the procedure and a reasonable person in like circumstances would have undergone the procedure, patient's right of self-determination is lost.
That conclusion necessarily impels one to inquire why a fulldisclosure court, sensitive to a patient's right of self-determination,
would determine the materiality of medical risks by the application
of an objective rather than a subjective standard. Even the
Canterbury court conceded that "[o]ptimally for the patient, expothe physician to disclose material risks and the first the capacity of a layman to determine
materiality. Still, it would be a foolish plaintiff's counsel who would forego the opportunity
of having a duly qualified expert identify as material that undisclosed risk which occasioned
plaintiff's injury, especially since the adequacy of defendant's disclosure is to be judged by
an objective standard under the Canterburyformulation. See also note 11 supra.
21. 464 F.2d at 784.
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sure of a risk would be mandatory whenever the patient would deem
it significant to his decision, either singly or in combination with
other risks. ' 22 Then why not use the subjective standard? The
Canterbury answer is:
Such a requirement, however, would summon the physician to
second-guess the patient, whose ideas on materiality could
hardly be known to the physician. That would make an undue
demand upon medical practitioners, whose conduct, like that
of others, is to be measured in terms of reasonableness. Consonantly with orthodox negligence doctrine, the physician's
liability for nondisclosure is to be determined on the basis of
foresight, not hindsight; no less than any other aspect of negligence, the issue on nondisclosure must be approached from the
viewpoint of the reasonableness of the physician's divulgence
in terms of what he knows or should know to be the patient's
informational needs. If, but only if, the fact-finder can say that
the physician's communication was unreasonably inadequate
is an imposition of liability legally or morally justified.
Apparently, the Canterbury court concluded that it would be
"legally" and "morally" unjustifiable to permit the imposition of
liability on a physician for his failure to apprise the patient of those
risks which the patient would have considered critical in deciding
whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy; rather, such liability is to be permitted only if the non-disclosure would have affected
the decision of a fictitious "reasonable patient," even though the
actual patient would have elected to forego the therapy had he been
fully informed. And the detrimental impact on the patient's right
of self-determination, presumably the raison d'etre for the fulldisclosure rule, is explained away in terms of fairness to the physician. To determine the legal, logical and equitable propriety of that
"bargain," it becomes necessary to examine the persuasiveness of
the court's stated concern over unfairness to the physician were a
subjective standard to be utilized.
It should be recalled that the full-disclosure rule is an alternative
to the professional-standard rule. Under the professional-standard
rule, the treating physician and the expert medical witnesses purport to be able to determine (1) the totality of the substantial risks
22.
23.

Id. at 787.
Id.
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involved, (2) those risks which might dissuade the patient from
consenting to the proposed therapy, and (3) that bundle of risks
from (1) and (2) which, if revealed to the patient, would have an
adverse effect on his physical or emotional well-being. Therefore,
they assert, the patient should be apprised of those risks in categories (1) and (2) less those in category (3).14 It would seem that to
assert the capacity to determine those factors necessary to establish
a professional standard by which to judge the scope of disclosure
asserts a capacity even greater than that which would be required
to make a full disclosure satisfactory to a particular patient. The
professional standard imputes to the physician both the capacity to
determine which risks might affect the patient's decision and which
risks might adversely affect the patient if revealed to him. That
imputed capacity rests on a professionally asserted unique insight
into the physical and emotional condition of the particular patient.
Reduced to its most essential and simplest form, the underlying
foundation for use of the professional standard is: The doctor knows
best. Why in the world disregard that asserted professional insight
simply because the test for determining the adequacy of the disclosure shifts from the professional standard to the full-disclosure rule?
Certainly the formulation and utilization of the latter test does
nothing in fact to diminish the unique insight into patients' needs
which the medical profession regularly purports to possess in informed consent cases in jurisdictions which retain the professional
standard rule. To conclude that the same insight into the informational needs of a particular patient exists in an informed consent
case in a jurisdiction which utilizes the full-disclosure rule would
impute to the treating physician no greater insight or foresight than
his professional colleagues regularly purport to possess in
professional-standard jurisdictions. Indeed, even in full-disclosure
jurisdictions, the physician may offer evidence tending to justify an
apparently inadequate disclosure on the grounds that "riskdisclosure [posed] such a threat of detriment to the patient as to
become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of
view. '2 5 It would seem, then, that to test the adequacy of the disclosure in a full-disclosure jurisdiction by the needs of the particular
patient, rather than by an objective standard utilizing a fictitious
24.
25.

See note 4 supra.
464 F.2d at 789.
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reasonable-person patient, would not constitute an inappropriate
imposition on the treating physician.
It is true, of course, as the Canterbury opinion indicates, that in
negligence actions generally the reasonable person standard is the
rule. Whether or not that general rule should be considered inexorably applicable to the alleged negligence of the physician in an informed consent case in a full-disclosure jurisdiction should depend,
in substantial measure, on the similarities or disparities between
the typical negligence action and the informed consent case.
Let's examine a typical negligence action. If defendant's alleged
negligence was in the manner of operation of his automobile, which
collided with plaintiff's car, defendant's conduct will indeed be
judged by the reasonable person standard. Certainly one reason for
that legal conclusion is that plaintiff had no right to expect more of
the defendant. Defendant's operation of his car did not constitute
any representation, express or implied, that defendant possessed
any skills or capacities beyond those of a reasonable person. A second and intimately related reason for application of the reasonable
person standard in such a case is the absence of any conduct on the
part of defendant which induced plaintiff to undertake a course of
action which plaintiff might otherwise have avoided. Presumably,
plaintiff would have been driving his car at the same time and place
absent any conduct at all on the part of defendant. Absent any such
inducement on the part of defendant, plaintiff cannot assert successfully that he was enticed into an expectation of conduct on the
part of defendant different from that of a reasonable person. And,
finally, there is a plaintiff-protecting reason for the application of a
reasonable person standard by which to judge defendant's conduct." If defendant driver were to be judged by a subjective rather
26. As stated by Justice Holmes in The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589, 596 (1905):
[Ilt is a mistake to say, as the petitioner does, that if the man on the spot, even an
expert, does what his judgment approves, he cannot be found negligent. The standard
of conduct, whether left to the jury or laid down by the court, is an external standard,
and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned. The notion that
"it should be coextensive with the judgment of each individual" was exploded, if it
needed exploding, by Chief Justice Tindal, in Vaughan v. Menlove.
The court in Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P. 1837) had stated:
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive
with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the
foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases
a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.
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than an objective standard, the ultimate "logical" conclusion would
be that defendant's conduct would be judged by defendant's standard; in most cases, conduct and standard would coincide, defendant would be deemed non-negligent and plaintiff would be denied
a recovery.
Now consider the relationship between physician and patient.
Clearly, the physician holds himself out as possessing superior
knowledge and skill in regard to the object of the professional relationship, and, just as clearly, patient implicitly recognizes and accepts that representation. Who in all the world would be better
equipped to guide, counsel and treat the patient medically than the
treating physician? And to whom, in all the world, would plaintiff
more naturally look for such guidance, counseling and treatment
than the treating physician? Their professional relationship is based
on the physician's implied representation of superior knowledge and
skill and the patient's reliance on that representation. Moreover,
the physician, unlike defendant driver, does induce the plaintiff to
undertake a course of action he otherwise might have avoided. That
inducement occurs in two ways. First, it seems fair to conclude that,
absent the professional relationship, patient would not have undergone the particular therapeutic treatment involved. Second, and,
simultaneously more specific and cogent to the issue, one of the
principal reasons for the relationship is plaintiff's desire to receive
adequate guidance and counsel in determining which course to follow by way of treatment. Inherent in the inducement which flows
from the physician's disclosure of information is the patient's reliance upon that information in determining whether or not to acquiesce in a particular course of proposed treatment. Finally, use of
a subjective standard in judging the adequacy of physician's disclosure-subjective in the sense of requiring disclosure of those factors
material to the particular patient-certainly would not lead to
nearly total immunity from liability for the physician. On the contraty, it would tend to be more plaintiff-protecting than the objective standard. Therefore, to the extent that utilization of the objective standard in the vehicle case is impelled by a plaintiff-protecting
desire, that same desire in an informed consent case would point
toward the utilization of a subjective standard. And, not just incidentally, use of the subjective standard in the informed consent case
would be plaintiff-protecting not only in the general sense of providing a meaningful opportunity for recovery but, as well, in the more
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specific sense of preserving the particular patient's right of selfdetermination, which perfectly complements the basic reason for
requiring full disclosure. That compination of (1) superior knowl-

edge impliedly asserted by the physician and implicitly accepted by
the patient, (2) the inducement and reliance by physician and patient, respectively, inherent in the professional relationship, and (3)
a desire to protect the plaintiff, in the general sense of making
recovery feasible and in the specific sense of preserving his right of
self-determination, dramatizes the patent distinctions between that
professional relationship and the roles of two automobile operators
using a public highway. Those distinctions, in turn, tend to support
the conclusion that use of the objective standard in negligence actions generally does not justify its use in determining the adequacy
of physician's disclosure to patient.
There is, in addition, an innate mechanical awkwardness in using
an objective rather than a subjective standard to test the adequacy
of the disclosure. In most instances in which the reasonable person
standard is used to judge a defendant's conduct, the standard and
the conduct are compared by the jury with its attention focused
primarily on the defendant and the circumstances in which he
acted; reference to the plaintiff, while relevant, tends to be of only
secondary significance. For example, in the case of the allegedly
negligent automobile operator, the jury would judge his conduct as
it compared with what a reasonable person in like circumstances
would have done. Consideration of plaintiff driver would tend to be
limited to his presence on the scene as one of the circumstances to
be considered. In such a case, defendant's conduct is judged by a
standard uniquely attuned to a defendant-analog: a reasonable person in like circumstances. But in an informed consent case, the
adequacy of defendant physician's disclosure can be judged only
with primary and critical attention focused upon the recipient of the
information offered. Where the actual recipient (the patient) is supplanted by a reasonable person in like circumstances (the objective
standard), the jury is required to judge the adequacy of defendant's
conduct by a plaintiff-analog, the reasonable person in circumstances similar to those of the patient.27 That subtle shift in standard
27. Actually, what the objective standard requires is what the reasonable physician would
know about the "informational needs" of the reasonable patient in circumstances similar to
those of the patient. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972). That creates
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personification, from defendant-analog to plaintiff-analog, imposes
on the jury the wrong exemplar by which to judge the defendant's
conduct; it requires the jury to determine the propriety of defendant's conduct by an objective standard attuned primarily to the
plaintiff.
That mechanical awkwardness, in turn, gives rise to this paradox:
the more precisely the reasonable person in like circumstances resembles the particular plaintiff patient, the more inappropriate the
objective standard would become for imposition on the defendant
physician; and the less distinctly the reasonable person in like circumstances resembles the particular plaintiff patient, the greater
would be the loss of the patient's right of self-determination. To the
extent that virtually all of the patient's idiosyncrasies are taken into
account in the jury's formulation of a reasonable person in like
circumstances, the resulting standard to be imposed on the defendant will be uniquely identical to the plaintiff. A standard so carefully tailored to fit the patient simply will not fit comfortably when
draped on the physician. To the extent that the particular patient's
idiosyncrasies, especially those possessing a substantial capacity for
affecting his decision of whether to accept or reject the proposed
therapy, are ignored in the jury's formulation of a reasonable person
in like circumstances, the patient's acknowledged (at least, in fulldisclosure jurisdictions) right of self-determination will be sacrificed. Once it is recognized that the adequacy of the physician's
disclosure can be tested sensibly only with primary and critical
attention focused upon the patient, the mechanical awkwardness of
imposing on the jury an objective plaintiff-analog for application to
the defendant's conduct, and the unfortunate paradox which that
imposition creates, can be eliminated simply and sensibly by permitting the jury to follow the dictates of common sense and logic
and determine the adequacy of the disclosure by determining if it
apprised the particular patient of all material risks.
Finally, the Canterburydesire to achieve fairness to the physician
seems hardly likely to be realized in fact by judging the adequacy
of physician's disclosure by an objective standard which consists of
two creatures of fiction: the objective physician and the objective patient. It seems fair to
conclude, as the text does, that, given those two "reasonable persons," the jury, in determining the adequacy of the disclosure, would look primarily to the analog of the recipient of the
information, the reasonable person in circumstances similar to those of the patient.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 14: 309

a reasonable person in circumstances similar to those of the patient.
No matter how precisely that objective standard takes into account
the idiosyncrasies of the particular patient, it will at best mirror a
flawed perception of the actual patient. So long as the jury has
imposed upon it a "reasonable person" patient, it will be required
to apply a standard distinguishable to some extent from the actual
patient. Necessarily, then, the jury's ultimate reasonable person
will be a creature of fiction. The physician will have had no professional relationship with that fictitious being, no opportunity to observe it, no opportunity to talk with it, and no opportunity to assess
its comprehension of and reaction to the physician's disclosure.
What reason is there to assume that the physician's disclosure
would have been more likely to reveal all of the material risks to this
creature of fiction than to the actual patient? The Canterbury answer presumably would be that the actual patient's "ideas on materiality could hardly be known to the physician,"2 and that "the
physician's liability for nondisclosure is to be determined on the
basis of foresight, not hindsight." 9 In effect, the Canterbury court
decided that the physician would be better able to determine and
predict the ideas on materiality of a reasonable patient as ultimately defined by a jury than the ideas on materiality of the actual
and conceivably unreasonablepatient. I find that decision lacking
in persuasiveness. Given the professional relationship which existed
between physician and patient, and the opportunity afforded physician by that relationship to explore the idiosyncrasies and even the
irrationalities of the patient, I would be inclined to believe that
physician would be at least as competent to discern the ideas on
materiality of the particular and potentially unreasonable patient
as he would be to determine the ideas on materiality of the fictitious
reasonable patient ultimately fashioned by a jury.
It would seem that preservation of the patient's right of selfdetermination, the touchstone of the full-disclosure rule, is better
served by use of a subjective standard to test the adequacy of the
physician's disclosure and that use of such a subjective standard
would not impose unduly on the physician. Consequently, I would
amend the language of Canterbury,
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
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[A] risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster
of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy."
to read:
A risk is material when the patient would attach significance
to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego
the proposed therapy.3"
30. Id.
31. There is an additional "fringe benefit" in rejecting Canterbury's objective standard
and embracing a subjective standard for judging the adequacy of defendant physician's
disclosure. If defendant's conduct is judged, as Canterbury says it should be, by a standard
which contemplates what "the physician knows or should know," the standard begins with a
"reasonable physician." If the standard includes, as Canterburysays it should, what a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would consider significant, it ends with a reasonable
patient. One would think that the most qualified witness in the world to testify to what a
reasonable physician in circumstances like the defendant's would reveal to a reasonable
patient in circumstances like the plaintiff's would be a physician practicing in the same
medical speciality as the defendant. And that comes so very close to paralleling the professional standard that it imperils the very existence of the full-disclosure rule. Even if plaintiff
is not required to introduce expert medical testimony as to the professional standard of
disclosure, it seems a virtual certainty that defendant will and that defendant's experts will
establish a standard entirely consistent with defendant's disclosure. If, after hearing defendant's experts establish a standard which perfectly reflects defendant's disclosure, the jury
is instructed to judge the adequacy of that disclosure by an objective standard, i.e., what a
reasonable physician would have taken to be the informational needs of a reasonable patient,
it seems very likely that the jury, if it believes the testimony of defendant's experts, will find
that testimony to be dispositive of the issue. To the extent that that occurs, the full-disclosure
rule will have been supplanted by the ostensibly rejected professional standard.
On the other hand, if the adequacy of defendant's disclosure is judged by a subjective
standard-revelation of all risks to which the particular patient would attach significance-the testimony of defendant's experts, though still relevant, would be much less likely
to be determinative. None of those experts could state conclusively what the defendant in
fact knew or should have known of his patient and none could state conclusively what the
particular patient considered material. Consequently, the jury would be free to accept the
totality of the testimony of defendant's experts without, simultaneously, tacitly applying the
professional standard in a jurisdiction which has rejected that standard and embraced the
full-disclosure rule.
At times, language appears in judicial decisions which implies a subjective test for determining the adequacy of the disclosure but the implication seems blunted or wholly overcome
by the totality of the opinion. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972):
In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to
reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses adequate
information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician's communica-
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Closely allied to the question of which standard should be used
to judge the adequacy of physician's disclosure, an objective or a
subjective one, is the question of which standard should be used to
determine whether or not, had an adequate disclosure been made,
consent would have been forthcoming. Consistent with its adoption
of an objective standard for measuring the adequacy of the disclosure, Canterbury adopts an objective standard for determining if
consent would have been extended or withheld, had an adequate
disclosure been made. 31 Just as use of an objective standard to measure the adequacy of disclosure diminishes the patient's right of selfdetermination, so too, the use of an objective standard to decide the
consent issue has precisely the same effect for precisely the same
reason. If the jury concludes that defendant physician's disclosure
tions to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that need is
whatever information is material to the decision. Thus the test for determining
whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision.
(Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 464 F.2d 772, 786.)
The quoted language preceding the parenthetical reference to Canterburymight well be read
as implying the propriety of a subjective test for judging the adequacy of the disclosure.
However, that implication is blunted by the mere reference to Canterbury and that blunting
effect is compounded when one discovers that the portion of the Canterbury opinion specifically referred to is directed to that court's rejection of the professional-standard rule and not
at all to a determination of whether an objective or subjective standard is to be employed in
determining the adequacy of disclosure. Moreover, the Cobbs opinion states, immediately
after the excerpt above quoted,
We point out, for guidance on retrial, an additional problem which suggests itself.
There must be a causal relationship between the physician's failure to inform and the
injury to the plaintiff. Such causal connection arises only if it is established that had
revelation been made consent to treatment would not have been given. Here the record
discloses no testimony that had plaintiff been informed of the risks of surgery he would
not have consented to the operation.
The patient-plaintiff may testify on this subject but the issue extends beyond his
credibility. Since at the time of trial the uncommunicated hazard has materialized, it
would be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not claim that had he been informed of
the dangers he would have declined treatment. Subjectively he may believe so, with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that justice will be served by placing the
physician in jeopardy of the patient's bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective
test is preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient's position have
decided if adequately informed of all significant perils. (Canterbury v. Spence, supra,
464 F.2d 772, 787.)
Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16 (some citations omitted).
Since the "consent" issue is so intimately related to the adequacy of the disclosure, it seems
fair to conclude that the court's adoption of Canterbury's objective test for determining
consent should be read as equivalent to the court's adoption of Canterbury's objective test
for judging the adequacy of the disclosure.
32. 464 F.2d at 791.
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was inadequate, it must then decide whether or not an adequate
disclosure would have elicited consent. Under the Canterbury formulation, the jury is to resolve that issue by determining whether
or not, had an adequate disclosure been provided, a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances would have acquiesced. To the
extent that plaintiff patient, given an adequate disclosure, would
have declined the proposed treatment and a reasonable person in
similar circumstances, as determined by the jury, would have consented, patient's right of self-determination is irrevocably lost. Still
bearing in mind that that basic right of self-determination is the
essential reason for the full-disclosure rule, one is compelled to ask
why that basic right is to be jeopardized by the imposition of an
objective standard in determining the consent issue. The
Canterbury answer is that the subjective
method of dealing with the issue of causation [i.e., whether or
not consent would have been forthcoming had an adequate
disclosure been made] comes in second-best. It places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness. It
places the factfinder in the position of deciding whether a speculative answer to a hypothetical question is to be credited. It
calls for a subjective determination solely on testimony of a
patient-witness shadowed by the occurrence of the undisclosed
risk.
Better it is, we believe, to resolve the causality issue on an
objective basis: in terms of what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of all
perils bearing significance. If adequate disclosure could reasonably be expected to have caused that person to decline the
treatment because of the revelation of the kind of risk or danger
that resulted in harm, causation is shown, but otherwise not.
The patient's testimony is relevant on that score of course but
it would not threaten to dominate the findings. And since that
testimony would probably be appraised congruently with the
factfinder's belief in its reasonableness, the case for a wholly
objective standard for passing on causation is strengthened.
Such a standard would in any event ease the fact-finding process and better assure the truth as its product.3
Viewed in its totality, that explanation for the adoption of an objec33.

Id. at 790-91 (footnotes omitted).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 14: 309

tive, rather than a subjective, standard for determining this causation issue comes down to one essential judicial recognition and concern. In virtually every such case, plaintiff patient will testify that,
given adequate disclosure, he would not have consented, and the
plaintiff's right to recover and the defendant physician's vulnerability to liability should not be made dependent on that self-serving
testimony of the plaintiff. How persuasive is that explanation?
It should be conceded immediately that indeed plaintiff will testify that, adequately informed, he would not have consented. To do
otherwise, would require the granting of defendent's motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, and would make one wonder why plaintiff
and his lawyer had invested all of the time, effort and money necessary for the preparation for and the participation in the trial.
Whether a subjective or an objective standard is utilized, plaintiff's
case will fail if plaintiff concedes that, given an adequate disclosure,
he would have consented. If a subjective standard is used, that
concession would be determinative of the standard and defendant
would prevail as a matter of law. Were an objective standard utilized, while plaintiff's concession would not be determinative of the
standard, it would nonetheless be conclusive as a matter of law
because, even given the objective standard, a sine qua non to a
legally sufficient plaintiff's case is evidence that the particular patient would not have consented. In reality, the objective standard
requires evidence from the plaintiff which would justify affirmative
determinations that neither the particular plaintiff patient nor a
reasonable person in like circumstances would have consented.
Thus, whichever standard is employed, plaintiff's testimony that he
would not have consented, given an adequate disclosure, should be
contemplated. But does it necessarily follow that the jury will believe that testimony? The concern implicit in the above quotation
from Canterbury suggests, unpersuasively, an affirmative answer.
Surely the jury will recognize the apparent self-interest underlying that testimony of the plaintiff. And, just as surely, counsel for
the defendant, in summation, will underscore that self-interest as a
critical factor to be considered by the jury in determining the credibility to be extended the plaintiff and the weight to be given his
testimony. In all likelihood, that portion of defendant's summation
will be contemplated by an instruction from the court to the jury
to take self-interest into account in determining matters of credibil-
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ity and weight. 4 Moreover, the jury is likely to realize that, selfinterest aside, the plaintiff may find it difficult to know factually
whether or not he would have consented, given an adequate disclosure, before suffering the ultimate adverse consequences. That, too,
seems calculated to affect the jury's determination of whether or not
to credit plaintiff's testimony that he would have withheld consent.
And, finally, it should be emphasized that, even assuming the use
of an objective standard, the jury's acceptance of plaintiff's testimony that he would not have consented is a prerequisite to a verdict
for the plaintiff. It is difficult to understand why that jury determination would become less reliable if the subjective standard were
employed.
Since jury acceptance of plaintiff's testimony that, given an appropriate disclosure, he would have withheld consent is a legal requirement for a verdict for the plaintiff, whichever standard is employed, the essential difference resulting from the selection of either
standard becomes clearer. If the objective standard is used, jury
acceptance of plaintiff's testimony is but one of two necessary factual determinations preceding a verdict for the plaintiff; there
would remain the necessity of an affirmative jury determination
that a reasonable person in plaintiff patient's circumstances likewise would have withheld consent. On the other hand, if the subjective standard is used, jury acceptance of plaintiffs testimony would
be dispositive of the consent issue. It is that consequence which
seems to have disturbed the Canterbury court. Why?
The above quoted excerpt from Canterburysuggests two reasons.
First, "[ilt places the factfinder in the position of deciding whether
a speculative answer to a hypothetical question is to be credited." 35
34. E.g., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STANDARDIZED JURY INSTRUCTION No. 31 (rev. ed. 1968)
provides:
In reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of any witness, and in weighing the
testimony of any witness, you may consider any matter that may have a bearing on
the subject. You may consider the demeanor and the behavior of the witness on the
witness stand; the witness' manner of testifying; whether the witness impresses you
as a truthful individual; whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate
memory and recollection; whether the witness has any motive for not telling the truth;
whether the witness had full opportunity to observe the matters concerning which he
has testified; whether the witness has any interest in the outcome of this case, or
friendship or animosity toward other persons concerned in this case.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. 464 F.2d at 791.
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However, as already indicated, the jury would be required to decide
whether or not to credit that "speculative" answer even if an objective standard were employed. And, were an objective standard used,
would not the jury's determination of whether or not a reasonable
person in like circumstances (that purely fictitious creature of the
law) would have consented impose upon the jury an additional and
perhaps even more "hypothetical question"? Second, the quoted
language above indicates that to treat plaintiff's testimony, if believed, as determinative of the consent issue would place "the physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness."3 So far
as that "hindsight and bitterness" are concerned, we have already
noted that the jury, in deciding credibility and weight, is certain to
take into account, along with plaintiffs self-interest, the fact that
his testimony that he would have withheld consent is an after-thefact declaration made subsequent to his having endured the adverse
consequences of the medical procedure. That should alleviate adequately any judicial concern that the jury, without appropriate reflection and discrimination, will accept plaintiff's testimony. The
only remaining objection to use of the subjective standard implied
in Canterbury is general unfairness to the physician. Presumably,
that feared unfairness is of the same nature and quality as the
feared unfairness arising from the utilization of a subjective, rather
than an objective, standard to judge the adequacy of the disclosure.
Obviously, the two issues are intimately related. For precisely the
same reasons stated earlier in support of the use of a subjective
standard in determining the adequacy of the disclosure, and in negating that expressed unfairness to the physician, it is submitted
that use of the subjective standard in determining whether or not
consent would have been forthcoming, given an adequate disclosure,
would impose no unfairness on the physician. On the contrary, it
would reflect accurately the implicit representation of superior
knowledge by the physician and the tacit acceptance of that representation by the patient, preserve the essential reason for adoption
of the full-disclosure rule-patient's right of self-determinationand afford the physician a meaningful opportunity during the professional relationship to determine the enlightened sincerity of the
particular patient's consent rather than compel the physician to
predict (at his potential peril) whether or not that ultimate creature
36.

Id. at 790-91.
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of the jury's fashioning (a reasonable person in circumstances like
those of the plaintiff) would consent. Consequently, I would amend
the Canterbury language,
Better it is, we believe, to resolve the causality issue on an
objective basis: in terms of what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of all
perils bearing significance. If adequate disclosure could reasonably be expected to have caused that person to decline the
treatment because of the revelation of the kind of risk or danger
that resulted in harm, causation is shown, but otherwise not.37
to read:
If adequate disclosure would have caused the patient to decline the treatment because of the revelation of the kind of risk
or danger that resulted in harm, causation is shown.
There is lurking in both the excerpt quoted from Canterbury and
in my own suggested amendment a delicate problem not merely of
causation but of proximate cause as well. That latent proximate
cause problem was not specifically before the court in Canterbury
but it could arise in almost any informed consent case in a fulldisclosure jurisdiction." Let's fashion a hypothetical set of facts
which will focus attention on and require resolution of the problem.
Having dealt with the methods of judging the adequacy of disclosure
and for determining if consent would have been forthcoming, given
an adequate disclosure, assume now (1) an inadequate disclosure,
(2) a determination that consent would not have been forthcoming
37. Id. at 791 (footnotes omitted).
38. See, e.g., Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 503
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974), wherein the district court stated:
Both at trial and on the present appeal, plaintiffs have contended that a causal
relationship between failure to disclose and the injury complained of is unnecessary
and irrelevant. This stance is clearly contra to the weight of modem authority in the
area of informed consent.
382 F. Supp. at 505 n.3 (citations omitted).
In Bowers, the court rejected as well plaintiff's assertion (and the suggestion contained in
this article) that whether or not consent would have been forthcoming, given an adequate
disclosure, "should [bel decided on a subjective basis, that is, would Mrs. Bowers herself
have undergone the hysterectomy had Dr. Garfield advised her of the risk of a vesicovaginal
fistula." Id. at 505. Relying in part on "[tihe preeminent federal case in point," Canterbury,
the Bowers court applied "the objective 'reasonable woman' test." Id. at 506.
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had an adequate disclosure been made, (3) adverse consequences
suffered by the patient as a result of the therapeutic measure utilized, but (4) adverse consequences resulting from a medically cognizable but non-material risk incident to the therapy. To become
somewhat more specific, but to avoid that degree of specificity
which would arouse more disagreement over medical opinion than
consideration of the legal problem, let's assign basic symbols to the
factors involved. The particular therapy gives rise to a number of
medically cognizable risks, a through d. Risks a through c are material. Physician discloses only risks a and b to patient and, given that
inadequate disclosure, patient consents to the therapy. Had disclosure of risk c been made, consent would not have been given. As a
result of the treatment, patient suffers adverse consequences produced by risk d, but not caused by any failure in administering the
therapy. Should physician be liable for these adverse consequences?
The issue presented is a "proximate cause" problem and may be
stated in the following manner: Should physician's failure to have
made an adequate disclosure be deemed the proximate cause of
patient's injury? To help resolve that issue, some legal history may
be appropriate. There was a time when the typical judicial characterization of an informed consent case involving an inadequate disclosure and adverse consequences was that of a "technical battery.'"I Absent an adequate disclosure, patient's express or implied
consent was not an informed consent. Absent an informed consent,
physician's contact with patient's body was a harmful or offensive
contact inflicted upon the person of another without that other's
consent and without legal privilege. Since these italicized words
constitute a nearly perfect hornbook description of a battery,"
39. A discussion of the judicial transition of informed consent cases from battery through
technical battery to negligence may be found in Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207
N.W.2d 297 (1973).
40. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965), which states:
Battery: Harmful Contact
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
See also M. Hii,.. H.

RosSEN.

W.

SOGG, SMITH'S REVIEW LEGAL GEM SERIES TORTS (3d ed.

1975), which reads:
LEGAL GEMS - Battery
I. The essential elements of a battery at common law are these:
(a) The defendant must intentionally by an act set in motion a force towards
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courts utilized that nomenclature. Probably two complementary
factors contributed to judicial utilization of the battery characterization of informed consent cases: a typical judicial impulse toward
stare decisis and the natural fevor of plaintiffs' counsel in representing clients' causes. From the point of view of plaintiff's counsel,
hardly anything could be more appealing than an approach which
invited a potential characterization of defendant's conduct in a
manner synonymous with an intentional wrong. From the point of
view of the court, the invitation was an enticing one because it
permitted the use of a familiar legal theory in dealing with the then
novel concept of "informed consent malpractice actions." Since, as
noted above, there is an apparent, if somewhat simplistic, analogy
between the absence of informed consent prior to the application of
the therapy and the intentianal tort of battery, courts recognized
the similarities and embraced the familiar language of a battery.
But it wasn't an entirely open-armed embrace. Courts were sensitive to a critical distinction between the classic battery and the
informed consent case. The former required an intentionally harmful or offensive contact; the latter almost invariably involved conduct lacking that degree of culpability and intended to be healing
rather than harmful-thus the phrase "technical battery." An immediate consequence of judicial use of the adjective "technical" was
preclusion of punitive damages," an element of recovery approprithe plaintiff, or a third person.
(b) The force must be wrongful, not justified by the usages of men.
(c) The force directed towards the plaintiff must be without his consent and
against his will.
(d) The force must cause physical contact with the person of the plaintiff.
2. The gist of the offense in battery is the unpermissible touching of the person of
the plaintiff without his consent.
41. "[Tlhese essentially negligence cases do not fit the traditional mold of situations
wherein punitive damages can be awarded." Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 614, 207
N.W.2d 297, 313 (1973).
As one commentator stated:
What appears to distinguish the case of the unauthorized operation from traditional
assault and battery cases is the fact that in almost all of the cases, the doctor is acting
in relative good faith for the benefit of the patient. It is true that in some cases the
results are not in fact beneficial, but the courts have stated repeatedly that doctors
are not insurers. The traditional assault and battery, on the other hand, involves a
defendant who is acting for the most part out of malice or in a manner which is
generally considered as "anti-social." And in general the assaulter and batterer is not
seeking to confer any benefit upon the plaintiff. . .This leads to the conclusion that
there is some basis for separating most of the [malpractice] cases discussed in this
paper from the traditional assault and battery.
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV.
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ate in cases involving intentional wrongs.
This early judicial recognition that, even assuming an inadequate
disclosure by defendant physician, his conduct was not intentionally wrongful but, rather, inadvertent or negligent, remains a critical factor in resolving our proximate cause issue. Given intentionally wrongful conduct on the part of a defendant, a court is likely
to impose liability for the totality of the adverse consequences produced by that conduct, however novel the actual injury or extraordinary the manner of injury may be. 2 But where defendant's conduct
does not exceed that level of culpability embraced by the word
negligence, his liability is likely to be limited by the scope of reasonable foreseeability.43 Thus, in our hypothetical case against defendant physician in which plaintiff patient seeks to recover for adverse
consequences produced by risk d, the liability issue is likely to be
resolved by determining whether or not such injury was reasonably
foreseeable.
The court may very well approach the reasonable foreseeability
question in a two-step process, asking, first whether injury of any
kind to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable at the time of defen381, 424 (1957).
In Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 P. 812 (1928), the court concluded that punitive
damages were legally inappropriate where defendant physicians performed a spinal puncture
on plaintiff as a result of mistaking her for another patient.
42. There is a definite tendency to impose greater responsibility upon a defendant
whose conduct has been intended to do harm, or morally wrong. More liberal rules are
applied as to the consequences for which he will be held liable, the certainty of proof
required, and the type of damage for which recovery is to be permitted, as well as the
measure of compensation. The defendant's interests have been accorded substantially
less weight in opposition to the plaintiff's claim to protection when moral iniquity is
thrown into the balance. Apparently the courts have more or less unconsciously worked
out an irregular and poorly defined sliding scale, by which the defendant's liability is
least where his conduct is merely inadvertent, greater when he acts in disregard of
consequences increasingly likely to follow, greater still when he intentionally invades
the rights of another under a mistaken belief that he is committing no wrong, and
greatest of all where his motive is a malevolent desire to do harm.
W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 7 at 30-31 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
43. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kinsman No.
2); Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kinsman No. 1); Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Miller Steamship Co., [19671 1 A.C. 617 (P.C. 1966) (Wagon Mound No. 2); Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (Wagon
Mound No. 1).
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dant's negligence4 4 (his failure to provide an adequate disclosure)
and, second, whether the manner of injury which occurred (injury
produced by risk d) was within the general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable."5
The first question would seem to require an affirmative answer.
When defendant failed to provide an adequate disclosure, one that
apprised the patient of medically cognizable and material risk c, it
was reasonably foreseeable that the treatment might result in injury
produced by that material risk.
The second question is considerably more difficult to answer. Presumably, plaintiff's assertion would be a two-pronged argument
leading to an affirmative answer to the question. First, since defendant's inadequate disclosure vitiated plaintiff's consent, any injury
resulting from the legally unconsented-to procedure utilized by defendant should be considered reasonably foreseeable. 6 Second,
since risk d was a medically cognizable (albeit not material) risk
incident to the procedure utilized by defendant, injury from that
risk was reasonably foreseeable in fact.
To some extent, the first argument would be more appropriate
were the defendant's conduct intentionally wrongful rather than
merely negligent. While it may be true that the inadequate disclosure vitiates the consent, damages should be limited to compensation for reasonably foreseeable injuries. Mere absence of a legally
sufficient consent, significant as that absence may be both from the
perspective of the patient and the law, should not result in the
imposition of damages wholly disproportionate to the degree of
culpability of the defendant. That same admonition would serve to
negate the efficacy of the implied assertion that the imposition of
damages for all adverse consequences would serve the desirable purpose of dissuading the defendant and others similarly situated from
utilizing inadequate disclosures in the future. Presumably, that deterrent effect, however desirable, would be served adequately by
limiting liability to those injuries reasonably foreseeable.
Plaintiff's second argument is considerably more persuasive and
44. In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., [1921] 3 K.B.
560 (C.A.). In Polemis the court applied only this first step and rejected the second.
45. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
46. In effect, this was the assertion of plaintiffs which was rejected in Bowers v. Garfield,
382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974).
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requires rather careful attention. It is true, of course, that once risk
d is defined as a medically cognizable risk incident to the procedure
utilized, injury produced by that risk tends to be reasonably foreseeable, even by the simple application of a priori logic. Acceptance of
that logic would lead inexorably to the conclusion that the specific
manner of injury was, indeed, within the general manner of injury
reasonably foreseeable. But there is a problem in accepting without
serious challenge that "logical" conclusion. That aspect of defendant's conduct which made it culpable was the absence of disclosure
of risk c; the injury resulted not from undisclosed material risk c but
from undisclosed non-material risk d. Thus it could be asserted that
there was an absence of a legal cause and effect relationship between
that aspect of defendant's conduct which made it culpable (failure
to warn of risk c) and the injury sustained (produced by risk d); put
another way, it could be said that the culpability did not produce
the injury. There are then coinciding divergent factors which must
be considered to resolve the proximate cause issue: the injury resulted from a medically cognizable risk incident to the procedure,
as to which procedure plaintiff's consent was uninformed, but the
injury-producing risk was not one which the defendant was required
to reveal.
The late Dean Prosser, in discussing the legal inefficacy of a consent produced by mistake or ignorance in the context of a battery
action, wrote:
[Tihe mistake must extend to the essential character of the
act itself, which is to say that which makes it harmful or offensive, rather than to some collateral matter which merely operates as an inducement . ...
The question sometimes has arisen in cases involving medical or surgical treatment, where the defendant is aware that the
patient does not understand the nature of the operation, or the
risk of undesirable consequences involved in it. Where there is
active misrepresentation, this has been held to invalidate the
consent, so that there is a battery; and the same has been held
where there has been mere nondisclosure of consequences
which the surgeon knew to be certain to follow. Beyond this,
there have been few decisions finding battery where there was
failure to disclose only a known risk of the treatment.
The greatest number of decisions now regard the failure to
disclose a mere risk of treatment as involving a collateral mat-
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ter, and negligence rather than intent, and so have treated the
question as one of negligent malpractice only, which brings into
question professional standards of conduct. The matter is
therefore more fully considered in connection with negligence."
That fuller consideration is:
A considerable number of late cases have involved the doctrine of "informed consent," which concerns the duty of the
physician or surgeon to inform the patient of the risk which
may be involved in treatment or surgery. The earliest cases
treated this as a matter of vitiating the consent, so that there
was liability for battery. Beginning with a decision in Kansas
in 1960, it began to be recognized that this was really a matter
of the standard of the professional conduct, since there will be
some patients to whom disclosure may be undesirable or even
dangerous for success of the treatment or the patient's own
welfare; and that what should be done is a matter of professional judgment in light of the applicable medical standards.
Accordingly, the prevailing view now is that the action, regardless of its form, is in reality one for negligence in failing to
conform to the proper standard, to be determined on the basis
of expert testimony as to what disclosure should be made. The
factors to be considered by the physician or surgeon include the
likelihood and seriousness of the bad result, the feasibility of
alternative methods, the interest of the patient, knowledge of
his past history, his emotional stability, the necessity of treatment, and the existence of an emergency. 8
Unfortunately, neither of those excerpts comes to grips with our
specific problem. The first excerpt, directed at the intentional tort
of battery, indicates that mistake or ignorance as to a "collateral
matter" will not vitiate a consent, but directs our attention to the
second excerpt as providing a "more fully considered" discussion of
informed consent cases considered as negligence actions. The second excerpt evidences Dean Prosser's preference for the negligence
characterization over the battery characterization49 and, as well perhaps, his preference for the professional-standard rule over the full47. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 18 at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. § 32 at 165-66 (footnotes omitted).
49. For a judicial discussion of the two characterizations see Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58
Wis. 2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973), in which the court, like Dean Prosser, expressed its
preference for the negligence theory.
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disclosure rule, but does not confront our proximate cause problem.
In our case, the non-disclosure cannot be characterized as going only
to a "collateral matter" since the revelation failed to disclose
material risk c; it was that inadequacy which compels a finding of
culpability. Yet it was the medically cognizable but non-material
risk d which produced the injury. In our case, causation in fact
exists because (1) the procedure did cause the injury and (2) plaintiff's consent to the procedure was uninformed (3) due to defendant's inadequate disclosure. Had an adequate disclosure been
given, consent would have been withheld, the procedure would not
have been employed and the injury would not have occurred. Still,
there remains the troubling fact that the inadequacy of the disclosure lay in the failure to warn of material risk c and the injury was
the realization of non-material, albeit medically cognizable, risk d.
In his chapter on proximate cause, Dean Prosser wrote:
It is quite possible, and often helpful, to state every question
which arises in connection with "proximate cause" in:the form
of a single question: was the defendant under a duty to protect
the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur? Such a
form of statement does not, of course, provide any answer to
the question, or solve anything whatever; but it does serve to
direct attention to the policy issues which determine the extent
of the original obligation and of its continuance, rather than to
the mechanical sequence of events which goes to make up causation in fact. The question becomes particularly helpful in
cases where the only issue is in reality one of whether the defendant is under any duty to the plaintiff at all-which is to say,
whether he stands in any such relation to the plaintiff as to
create any legally recognized obligation of conduct for his benefit. Or, reverting again to the starting point, whether the interests of the plaintiff are entitled to legal protection at the defendant's hands against the invasion which has in fact occurred.
Or, again reverting, whether the conduct is the "proximate
cause" of the result. The circumlocution is unavoidable, since
all of these questions are, in reality, one and the same. ' "
Several caveats about our consideration of this excerpt are appropriate. First, it was written, not with specific attention to informed
consent cases or even medical malpractice actions generally but,
50.

PROSSER, supra note 42, § 42 at 244-45 (footnotes omitted).
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rather, for general application to proximate cause problems. Yet, at

times, reversion to basic principles can be uniquely helpful in resolving specific issues in particularized circumstances. Second, by
its own terms, the excerpt's suggested'question is "particularly
helpful in cases where the only issue is in reality one of whether the
defendant is under any duty to the plaintiff at all." In our case, the
physician clearly owed a duty to the patient: the legally imposed
obligation to proffer an adequate disclosure. By hypothesis, physician violated that duty. But, as the excerpt indicates, the suggested
question may have relevance in other circumstances and, indeed, all
of the stated circumstances are intimately related.
Raising the suggested question in our specific context, was the
physician under a duty to protect the patient against injury from
risk d? In attempting to answer that question, we should recognize
that the word duty is, in reality, a loaded word. A duty exists if a
court deems it appropriate to impose such a duty; it does not, if the
court deems it inappropriate. Duty, then, is a legal conclusion
rather than a self-apparent concept. Consequently, the question
may be rephrased as whether a legal duty should be imposed on the
physician to protect the patient from risk d. The answer is no.5'
Had the physician disclosed to the patient all of the material
risks, a, b and c, before receiving patient's consent, and had patient
then suffered adverse consequences from non-material but
medically cognizable risk d, of course no liability would be imposed
on physician. I think there are two basic reasons why that is so.
First, by definition, physician's conduct would not have been culpable; by revealing all material risks to the patient, physician provided a legally sufficient disclosure. Second, physician owed no duty
to patient to "protect" him from non-material risk d; physician was
not required to disclose that risk and the adverse consequences produced by it were not caused by any negligent performance of the
therapy by the physician. The most damning characterization
which can be made of physician's legally inadequate disclosure is
that it induced the patient to consent to a form of therapy which
patient would have eschewed had he been apprised of material risk
51. This conclusion would be consistent with the court's conclusion in Bowers v. Garfield,
382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974), rejecting
plaintiffs' assertion that "a causal relationship between failure to disclose and the injury
complained of is unnecessary and irrelvant."
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c. While it is factually true that, had patient chosen to forego the
therapy he would have avoided the consequences produced by risk
d, there is the absence of an appropriate legal relationship between
the sole aspect of physician's conduct which was culpable (failure
to disclose risk c) and the adverse consequences suffered by patient
(produced by risk d). Imposition of liability on the physician for
those adverse consequences might be appropriate if physician's conduct had been intentionally wrongful or wholly lacking in social
utility. But we have noted the judicial recognition that informed
consent cases involve alleged negligence, not intentional wrongs,
and certainly no one would doubt that physician's principal purpose
was to heal rather than harm the patient. The physician's conduct,
though culpable because of the inadequacy of the disclosure, seems
not to require judicial deterrence beyond that which would be effected by the prospect. of liability for adverse consequences
produced by undisclosed material risk c. And patient, never entitled
by law to a disclosure of non-material risk d, hardly could argue
successfully that his reasonable expectations were frustrated by a
judicial determination that he could not recover damages for the
adverse consequences produced by that risk. Therefore, I would
conclude that the formulation suggested earlier for resolving the
consent issue-"[i]f adequate disclosure would have caused the
patient to decline the treatment because of the revelation of the
kind of risk or danger that resulted in harm, causationis shown"should be read with the understanding that the italicized words are
intended to be dispositive of the proximate-cause issue.
One final problem must be examined. Early in the article, reference was made to the case in which a surgeon caused a general
anesthesia to be administered to a patient weakened by the recent
ingestion of a substantial quantity of alcohol and patient died as a
result of that administration.2 Then we noted the differing roles of
expert medical witnesses called by plaintiff in a wrongful death
action against surgeon, depending on whether the action was
couched in terms of a negligent decision by defendant or the absence
of an informed consent by the now deceased patient. The present
inquiry will be limited to the informed consent theory of liability.
Assume that, despite his alcohol-weakened physical condition,
patient was fully capable of comprehending an adequate disclosure
52.

See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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of the particular material risk of administering the anesthesia to
him and that plaintiff in the wrongful death action alleges that (1)
no such disclosure was made and (2) had it been made, patient
would not have consented. Assume, too, 'that at the time surgeon
and patient discussed the proposed procedure (repair of a fractured
arm), no one else was present. What happens to plaintiff's informed
consent case? Under existing law, it would fail as a matter of law
because of plaintiff's inability to present evidence that an adequate
disclosure had not been made. That inability would exist because
of patient's death during surgery. And, rather obviously, a similar
inability may exist in every informed consent case in which the
patient dies during or shortly after the therapeutic procedure. Is
that an acceptable legal conclusion?
It is true that in negligence actions generally the plaintiff bears
the burden of persuasion and suffers the consequence of a failure to
adduce evidence necessary to make out a legally sufficient case. For
example, if an automobile collision results in the death of one driver
and a wrongful death action against the other, plaintiff will be required to present evidence demonstrating the negligence of defendant or suffer the legal consequences, probably the granting of defendant's motion for a nonsuit or a directed verdict. If there were
no witnesses to the collision other than the drivers, and no other
witnesses, lay or expert, who can testify that the collision was the
result of defendant's negligence, plaintiff has two alternatives, neither very satisfactory. Plaintiff can suffer the granting of defendant's nonsuit or directed verdict motion or plaintiff can summon
the defendant to the stand as on cross-examination and hope that
defendant's testimony will demonstrate his own culpability. Rather
clearly, that second alternative rests on a hope not likely to be
realized in very many cases.53 A combination of factors, including
defendant's recognition of his own self-interest, defendant's adequate preparation for trial by his counsel and defendant's conceivably firmly based belief in his own freedom from fault, suggest that
53. An exception to that general conclusion occurred in Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299
(Tex. 1967). There plaintiff, in an effort to establish the professional standard for disclosure,
called defendant physician to the stand as on cross-examination. Defendant "testified that
standard medical practice would have included advice about the chance of Scott's total loss
of hearing" incident to the proposed stapedectomy. Id. at 303. Plaintiff testified that defendant had failed to reveal that risk to him; defendant testified that he had. The defendant's
testimony as on cross-examination made the plaintiff's case legally sufficient.
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defendant's testimony is more likely to be exculpating than inculpating. Thus, in most such cases, plaintiff is unlikely even to reach
the jury. And, as unsatisfactory as that may seem to the plaintiff,
generally it is a legally palatable result flowing from plaintiff's inability to present inculpating evidence against the defendant, even
where that inability flows directly from the death of the plaintiff's
testate or intestate.
But there are certain characteristics which distinguish substantially the abortive wrongful death action against defendant motorist
and the wrongful death action brought against defendant physician
and resting on the asserted absence of patient's informed consent.
To a substantial extent, those distinctions were noted earlier in this
article to support the suggested conclusions that in informed consent cases both the adequacy of physician's disclosure and the determination of whether or not patient would have consented, given an
adequate disclosure, should be judged by a subjective standard attuned to the particular patient.
The physician-patient relationship necessarily implies a tacit representation of superior knowledge on the part of the physician and
an implicit reliance on that superior knowledge by the patient. Neither exists in the usual motor vehicle collision case. The existence
of the professional relationship results in an inducement to undergo
a particular course of treatment. No such inducement exists in the
motor vehicle case. Moreover, where physician and patient discuss
the desirability of a proposed therapeutic procedure, there necessarily arises a feasible opportunity for creating some evidence of the
nature or substance of that discussion, which would subsist even
after patient's death. Obviously, no similar opportunity exists in the
factual setting of most motor vehicle collisions. One thing which
both wrongful death actions-that against defendant motorist and
that against defendant physician-would have in common is the
unlikelihood that the defendant, called to the stand as on crossexamination, would sufficiently inculpate himself to convert the
plaintiff's potentially insufficient case into a legally sufficient cause
of action-and for precisely the same reasons. 4 Therefore, in the
informed consent case, plaintiff's right to summon the defendant to
the stand is about as unlikely to avoid a nonsuit or a directed verdict
as it would be in the collision case.
54.

For the exception to the rule, see note 53 supra.
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In light of the distinctions between the physician-patient relationship and the relationship between two motor vehicle operators, it
seems inappropriate to maintain a legal theory which virtually assures the failure of a wrongful death against a physician, based on
the absence of patient's informed consent, in those cases where
patient dies during or shortly after the therapeutic procedure-even
accepting the propriety of a similar result in the motor vehicle case.
In recognition of the unlikelihood that defendant physician, called
as on cross-examination, will save the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's
case, some other method must be employed if the undesirable legal
consequence of patient's death is to be avoided. Since the professional relationship provides an opportunity for creating subsisting
evidence of the physician's disclosure and the patient's reaction
thereto, and because the physician "controls" both the relationship
and the opportunity, I find myself inclined toward a method which
would encourage the physician to take appropriate advantage of
both. That encouragement would arise out of a rule of law that, in
those informed consent cases in which patient dies during or shortly
after and as a result of the therapeutic procedure utilized, the burden of presenting evidence of an informed consent should be on the
physician and that burden should not be deemed satisfied by the
uncorroborated testimony of the physician.
Given such a rule of law, it seems fair to conclude that physicians
would utilize the opportunity presented by the professional relationship with their patients to fashion some form of continuing evidence
of an informed consent. Since no physician could predict with certainty which patients would die during or shortly after the therapeutic procedure, each physician would tend to utilize the opportunity
with every patient. That, in turn, would tend toward not only the
elimination of the present almost certain legal insufficiency of plaintiff's wrongful death action flowing from patient's death but would,
as well, tend toward providing defendant physician with more specific evidence of an informed consent in all cases. And, ultimately,
such a rule would have the effect of sensitizing physicians generally
to the significance of assuring adequate disclosures which are properly comprehended by their patients. Presumably, that ultimate
consequence would be entirely consistent with, and effectively complementary to, the basic rationale for the full-disclosure rule: patient's right of self-determination.
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The method of creating such subsisting evidence should be left to
the physician. He should be permitted to determine the most appropriate method of the several which suggest themselves: recordings
(effected with the patient's acquiescence) of the disclosure and patient's knowing consent, a written disclosure and a written consent,55 a disclosure and a consent made in the presence of appropriate third parties, either other professionals or immediate members
of the patient's family. In deciding which alternative to employ from
among these or as many others as may occur to the physician, the
physician can be counted on to be appropriately sensitive both to
the patient's right of self-determination and the ultimate legal efficacy of the evidence created. Each of those considerations should
tend to emphasize to the physician the significance of the other in
a mutually nurturing manner.
In those jurisdictions having Dead Man's Acts " which would
55. For a statute providing that a written consent immunizes the physician from liability
in certain circumstances, see GA. CODE ANN. tit. 88, § 2906 (1971):
A consent to medical and surgical treatment which discloses in general terms the
treatment or course of treatment in connection with which it is given and which is duly
evidenced in writing and signed by the patient or other person or persons authorized
to consent pursuant to the terms hereof, shall be conclusively presumed to be a valid
consent in the absence of fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts in obtaining
the same.
The statute is set forth for the reader's general information. I would not propose the general
enactment of such statutes or approve of this specific one. The statutory approval of a
disclosure "in general terms" seems to me too vague and evidences a predictable legislative
difficulty in attempting to contemplate the kind of disclosure required in a particular factual
setting.
56. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE tit. 23, § 2317.03 (1955), which provides:
A party shall not testify when the adverse party is. . . an executor or administrator
• . .of a deceased person except:
(A) As to facts which occurred . . . after the time the decedent . . . died . . .
See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 325 (1958), which provides:
[11n any civil proceeding . . . although a party to a thing or contract in action may
be dead. . . nevertheless any surviving. . . party to such thing or contract. . . whose
interest is adverse to the . . . right of such deceased . . . party, shall be a competent
witness to any relevant matter, although it may have occurred before the death of said
party . . . if and only if such relevant matter occurred between himself and another
person who may be living at the time of trial and may be competent to testify, and
does so testify upon the trial against such surviving. . . party . . . or if such relevant
matter occurred in the presence or hearing of such other living or competent person.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the applicability of Dead Man's Acts in nonfederal causes of action tried in federal courts:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim
or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a
witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 601.
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"seal the lips" of the defendant physician in plaintiff's wrongful
death action, that effect should be avoided either by judicial construction of the statute or by legislative amendment. Permitting the
physician to testify would serve not only as a quid pro quo for
imposing upon him the burden of producing evidence of an informed
consent but, as well, as an assurance that physician would be able
to offer that testimonial foundation which might be required as a
prerequisite to admissibility of the subsisting evidence of patient's
informed consent. Recognition that such a testimonial foundation
may be required, suggests the propriety of shifting the burden of
presenting evidence onto the physician only in those wrongful death
actions in which defendant physician survives. And shifting the
burden of adducing evidence is all that I suggest; I would retain the
usual burden of persuasion imposed on the plaintiff, once defendant
physician has presented appropriate evidence of patient's informed
consent.
Because it would (1) eliminate the apparent unfairness of the
virtually certain legal insufficiency of a wrongful death action based
on an absence of informed consent, (2) accurately reflect the reality
of the professional relationship and its opportunity for creating
subsisting evidence of patient's informed consent, (3) nurture the
physician's sensitivity to the patient's right of self-determination,
and (4) tend to provide more specific evidence of informed consent
in all cases, I would suggest that courts in full-disclosure jurisdictions fashion a rule of law which would impose upon surviving defendant physician the burden of adducing evidence, beyond the
wholly uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, of patient's informed consent in those cases in which patient dies during or shortly
after the therapeutic procedure utilized as a result of the procedure,
and that in such cases defendant physician be considered a fully
competent witness notwithstanding the death of patient.
The suggestions contained in this article are not likely to arouse
unanimous approbation; they may very well stimulate agitated
rejection by many of those who read the article. Perhaps the most
assuaging single comment I can make about them is that they seem
to me to be calculated to produce a desirable physician-patient
relationship and to achieve realization of the patient's right of selfdetermination, the essence of the full-disclosure rule.

